llegal nanny in the basement. Frantic 911 phone calls. Midnight inauguration…

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I At NevadaTODAY,
we round-up news links and offer opinion and analysis on the
always-entertaining Gov. Jim Gibbons of Nevada. Our Governor

 
makes your
Governor look pretty good!

DAVID KELLY COMMITS SUICIDE AFTER SPILLING THE BEANS ON IRAQ INTELLIGENCE

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BBC NEWS | Politic

Hutton report in depth

Timeline: Hutton report

24 September, 2002

Iraq dossier published by the government.

The dossier of intelligence material was published to highlight what
Tony Blair considered the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. In the
foreword, he claimed that weapons of mass destruction could be launched
by Iraq within 45 minutes. In May the following year BBC reporter
Andrew Gilligan was to claim that this document had been
&”;sexed-up&”; by Downing Street and that the 45 minutes claim
was wrong.

22 May, 2003

Kelly tells Foreign Office official Patrick Lamb that he has spoken to the BBC.

29 May, 2003

Andrew Gilligan’s Today programme report is broadcast.

In his radio report Andrew Gilligan brought to light the concerns of
what he said was a senior source. The source had told him that the
intelligence community had not been comfortable with some of the
dossier’s contents, especially the 45 minute claim. On the day Downing
Street denied the thrust of Mr Gilligan’s story and said the dossier
was entirely the work of the intelligence services.

1 June, 2003

In the Mail on Sunday Gilligan says Alastair Campbell ‘sexed up’ the dossier

2 June, 2003

Newsnight broadcasts a story sourced from Dr Kelly.

Newsnight’s Science Editor, Susan Watts, reported that there were
problems with the 45 minute claim made in the dossier, calling it
&”;shaky&”;. br brHer reporting was also sourced from David
Kelly although her stories did not go as far as Andrew Gilligan’s in
pointing a finger at Alastair Campbell.

6 June, 2003

Campbell complains to the BBC about Gilligan.

Tony Blair’s communication chief challenged the BBC to stand by Andrew
Gilligan’s original story. In his letter to the Director of News,
Richard Sambrook, Mr Campbell said that the BBC’s reporting had given
the impression that the government took Britain into the war in Iraq on
a false basis.

17 June, 2003

Lamb tells deputy head of defence intelligence, Martin Howard, that Kelly had spoken to the BBC

19 June, 2003

Gilligan gives evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

25 June, 2003

Campbell gives evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

26 June, 2003

Campbell writes to the BBC, backing up his apology demand

27 June, 2003

Gilligan tells the BBC’s director of news the source for his story

30 June, 2003

Kelly writes to his line manager, admitting dealing with Gilligan

4 July, 2003

Kelly is warned against further contact with journalists by the MOD

7 July, 2003

Parliament clears Campbell of ‘sexing up’ the dossier.

After studying the issue MPs clear Alastair Campbell of including the
45 minute claim in the government’s dossier. Writing in the Mail on
Sunday in May Andrew Gilligan said his source believed the opposite.
MPs also said that Campbell &”;did not exert or seek to exert
improper influence&”; on the dossier’s production. Although the
committee did conclude that the 45 minute claim &”;did not warrant
the prominence given to it&”;.

9 July, 2003

Kelly is named in the press as Gilligan’s source.

When asked, the Ministry of Defence press office confirmed David
Kelly’s name as the source of Andrew Gilligan’s stories to a few print
journalists. This proved to be a crucial turn of events. Once Dr
Kelly’s name was out, he was caught up in a very intense row between
the government and the BBC. How his name became known is key to the
Hutton Inquiry.

15 July, 2003

Kelly appears before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

16 July, 2003

Kelly gives evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee

17 July, 2003

Kelly goes missing and is later found dead.

At 1520 BST Dr Kelly set off for a walk near his Oxfordshire home. When
he did not return his wife called the police at 2340 BST. The search
continued through the night but Dr Kelly’s body was not found until the
following day. It was presumed that his death was suicide after cuts to
his wrist were discovered. Tony Blair announced that a public inquiry
would be held into his death.

19 July, 2003

A post-mortem on Kelly is released

20 July, 2003

The BBC publicly acknowledges that Kelly was Gilligan’s source.

1 August, 2003

Lord Hutton’s inquiry investigating Kelly’s death officially opens.

11 August, 2003

The Hutton Inquiry starts taking evidence, Gilligan appears on day two.

During the first week of evidence Dr Kelly’s role in the production of
the dossier (he worked on the historical aspects of the paper and
advised on other parts) was set out. BBC reporters Andrew Gilligan,
Susan Watts and Gavin Hewitt all attended the inquiry. Andrew Gilligan
admitted that his reporting was &”;not perfect&”;.

19 August, 2003

The second week of evidence includes Alastair Campbell.

Week two was dominated by evidence from journalists and press officers.
Alastair Campbell, Tony Blair’s communications chief, attended the
inquiry and denied that he had anything to do with adding the 45
minutes claim to the dossier. Journalists from the Guardian, the
Observer and the Times also told of their dealings with Dr Kelly.

28 August, 2003

Tony Blair is the main witness for week three.

The prime minister’s appearance was the main headline from the third
week of the inquiry. He took full responsibility for the decisions
taken in relation to David Kelly. Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon claimed
to know little about his department’s role in the affair. The BBC
Chairman Gavyn Davies also appeared, and admitted that he was unaware
of Andrew Gilligan’s editor’s opinion that Mr Gilligan’s 45 minute
claim report had been flawed.

1 September, 2003

The Kelly family appear at the inquiry in week four.

Dr Kelly’s wife, Janice, appeared at the beginning of the week. She was
followed by her daughter, Rachel. Their testimony painted in detail the
stress that Dr Kelly was under once his name was connected with Andrew
Gilligan’s story. Later in the week a former intelligence analyst shone
more light on the dossier’s production. Brian Jones told the inquiry
that in his opinion the dossier had been &”;over-egged&”; in
certain respects.

4 September, 2003

Part one of the inquiry closes

15 September, 2003

The Inquiry re-opens.

The inquiry re-opens with both Andrew Gilligan and the BBC director
general Greg Dyke giving evidence. On Monday Mr Dyke called Alastair
Campbell’s attacks on the BBC &”;unprecedented&”;. But he also
called Andrew Gilligan’s e-mail leaking Dr Kelly’s name to MPs
&”;unacceptable&”;. Appearing for the second time two days
later Mr Gilligan admitted making mistakes with his story. He put it
down to &”;a slip of the tongue&”; during a live broadcast.

22 September, 2003

Campbell and Hoon return.

Alastair Campbell and Geoff Hoon testify to the inquiry on the same
day. The defence secretary insisted that there wasn’t &”;the
slightest shred of evidence&”; that the government had deliberately
leaked Dr Kelly’s name. While the out-going government communications
chief had extracts from his diary published. They showed how he
believed that the naming of Dr Kelly would place Andrew Gilligan in a
very difficult position.

25 September, 2003

The inquiry closes.

The inquiry closes with Lord Hutton saying his report would be
published by December. Statements from the legal representatives of the
government, the BBC, Andrew Gilligan and the Kelly family were all
heard. The Kelly family QC said the weapons expert had been used by the
government &”;as a pawn in their political battle with the
BBC&”;. The government QC argued it was &”;completely
unjustified&”; to criticise the government for trying to reveal Dr
Kelly’s name.

28 January, 2004

Lord Hutton delivers his report

Lord Hutton delivers his longawaited report into the death of the
government weapons expert Dr David Kelly. In it he criticises BBC
journalist Andrew Gilligan for reporting “unfounded” allegations
against the government.

29 January, 2004

Greg Dyke resigns as director general

The director general became the second high profile casualty at the BBC
in the wake of the publication of Lord Hutton’s critical report. He was
replaced by Mark Byford on a temporary basis. Mr Dyke said that he
hoped his resignation would draw a line under the affair.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/3099378.stm

Published: 2004/01/28 16:45:03 GMT
s | Timeline: Hutton report

STICKING TO THE SCRIPT :: FLASHBACK, HOWARD DEAN

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above: HOW OUR FRIENDS HONOR THEIR DEAD

As Howard Dean’s behavior in the past days has become more
and more curious, it has also become more and more outlandish.
Dean continues to lash out at John Kerry as one who is hostage
to “the special interests” and even went so far as to
call him a Republican, no less. Dean’s proclivity for becoming
unhinged continues apace. Hardly a day passes without Dean providing
further proof that he is not fit to be the President of the United
States, let alone a primary election candidate.

It is a shame Dean doesn’t get it. He is finished, and as
Laurence O’Donnell of MSNBC so aptly put it on Dennis
Miller Live, Dean was already finished before his post Iowa
tirade. Laurence also astutely pointed out how embarrassing it
was for Al Gore and Bill Bradley to get suckered in to endorsing
Dr. Dean. As we suggested earlier on this site Dean probably peaked
on the day Gore endorsed him. From then on it was all down hill.

From: Analyze-Media.com/Television.html

According To Sources Familiar With The Probe: WALTER PINCUS/REPORTER

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washingtonpost.com

Probe Focuses on Month Before Leak to Reporters

FBI Agents Tracing Linkage of Envoy to CIA Operative

By Walter Pincus and Mike Allen
Washington Post Staff Writers

Sunday, October 12, 2003; Page A01


FBI agents investigating the disclosure of a CIA
officer’s identity have begun by examining events in the month before
the leak, when the CIA, the White House and Vice President Cheney’s
office first were asked about former ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV’s
CIA-sponsored trip to Niger
,
 according to sources familiar with the
probe….. (irony alert)

The name of Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, a clandestine case
officer, was revealed in a July 14 column by Robert D. Novak that
quoted two unidentified senior administration officials.

In their interviews, FBI agents are asking questions about events
going back to at least early June, the sources said. That indicates
investigators are examining not just who passed the information to
Novak and other reporters but also how Plame’s name may have first
become linked with Wilson and his mission, who did it and how the
information made its way around the government.

Administration sources said they believe that the officials who
discussed Plame were not trying to expose her, but were using the
information as a tool to try to persuade reporters to ignore Wilson.
The officials wanted to convince the reporters that he had benefited
from nepotism in being chosen for the mission.

What started as political gossip and damage control has become a
major criminal investigation that has already harmed the administration
and could be a problem for President Bush for months to come.

One reason investigators are looking back is that even before
Novak’s column appeared, government officials had been trying for more
than a month to convince journalists that Wilson’s mission was not as
important as it was being portrayed. Wilson concluded during the 2002
mission that there was no solid evidence for the administration’s
assertion that Iraq was trying to acquire uranium in Niger to develop
nuclear weapons, and he angered the White House when he became an
outspoken critic of the war.

The FBI is trying to determine when White House officials and
members of the vice president’s staff first focused on Wilson and
learned about his wife’s employment at the agency. One group that may
have known of the connection before that time is the handful of CIA
officers detailed to the White House, where they work primarily on the
National Security Council staff. A former NSC staff member said one or
more of those officers may have been aware of the Plame-Wilson
relationship.

White House press secretary Scott McClellan said in response to a
query for this article: “I think it would be counterproductive during
an ongoing investigation for me to chase rumors and speculation. The
president has directed the White House to cooperate fully, and that is
exactly what we are doing.”

Investigators are trying to establish the chain of events leading to
the leak because, for a successful prosecution under the law
prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of a covert U.S. officer’s name,
the disclosure must have been intentional, the accused must have known
the person was a covert officer and the identity must not have been
disclosed earlier.

The first public mention of Wilson’s mission to Niger, albeit
without identifying him by name, was in the New York Times on May 6, in
a column by Nicholas D. Kristof. Kristof had been on a panel with
Wilson four days earlier, when the former ambassador said State
Department officials should know better than to say the United States
had been duped by forged documents that allegedly had proved a deal for
the uranium had been in the works between Iraq and Niger.

Wilson said he told Kristof about his trip to Niger on the condition
that Kristof must keep his name out of the column. When the column
appeared, it created little public stir, though it set a number of
reporters on the trail of the anonymous former ambassador. Kristof
confirmed that account.

The column mentioned the alleged role of the vice president’s office
for the first time. That was when Cheney aides became aware of Wilson’s
mission and they began asking questions about him within the
government, according to an administration official.

In the meantime, Wilson was pressing his case. He briefed two
congressional committees conducting inquiries into why the president
had mentioned the uranium allegation in his Jan. 28 State of the Union
address. He also began making frequent television appearances.

In early June, Wilson told his story to The Washington Post on the
condition that his name be withheld. On June 12, The Post published a
more complete account than Kristof’s of Wilson’s trip. Wilson has now
given permission to The Post to identify him as one source for that
article.

By that time, officials in the White House, Cheney’s office, the CIA
and the State Department were familiar with Wilson and his mission to
Niger.

Starting that week, the officials repeatedly played down the
importance of Wilson’s trip and its findings, saying it had been
authorized within the CIA’s nonproliferation section at a low level
without requiring the approval of senior agency officials. No one
brought up Wilson’s wife, and her employment at the agency was not
known at the time the article was published.

Wilson’s oral report to a CIA officer had been turned into a routine
one-and-a-half page CIA intelligence memo to the White House and other
agencies. By tradition, his identity as the source, even though he went
under the auspices of the CIA, was not disclosed.

“This gent made a visit to the region and chatted up his friends,”
a senior intelligence official said last June in describing the
agency’s view of the mission. Regarding the allegation about Iraq
seeking uranium, the official said: “He relayed back to us that they
said it was not true and that he believed them.”

The Post article generated little public response. But behind the
scenes, Bush officials were concerned. “After the June story, a lot of
people in government were scurrying around asking who is this envoy and
why is he saying these things,” a senior administration official said.

Wilson said he attempted to increase pressure on the White House
the day after the June 12 article was published by calling some present
and former senior administration officials who know national security
adviser Condoleezza Rice. He wanted them to tell Rice that she was
wrong in her comment on NBC’s “Meet the Press” on June 8 that there may
be some intelligence “in the bowels of the agency,” but that no one
around her had any doubts about the uranium story.

Wilson said those officials told him Rice was not interested and he
should publish his story in his own name if he wanted to attract
attention.

On July 6, Wilson went public. In an interview published in The
Post, Wilson accused the administration of “misrepresenting the facts
on an issue that was a fundamental justification for going to war.” In
an opinion article the same day in the New York Times, he wrote that
“some of the intelligence related to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was
twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.”

On “Meet the Press” that day, Wilson said: “Either the
administration has some information that it has not shared with the
public or, yes, they were using the selective use of facts and
intelligence to bolster a decision in the case that had already been
made, a decision that had been made to go war.”

On July 7, the White House admitted it had been a mistake to include
the 16 words about uranium in Bush’s State of the Union speech. Four
days later, with the controversy dominating the airwaves and drowning
out the messages Bush intended to send during his trip in Africa, CIA
Director George J. Tenet took public blame for failing to have the
sentence removed.

That same week, two top White House officials disclosed Plame’s
identity to least six Washington journalists, an administration
official told The Post for an article published Sept. 28. The source
elaborated on the conversations last week, saying that officials
brought up Plame as part of their broader case against Wilson.

“It was unsolicited,” the source said. “They were pushing back. They used everything they had.”

Novak has said he began interviewing Bush officials about Wilson
shortly after July 6, asking why such an outspoken Bush policy critic
was picked for the Niger mission. Novak reported that Wilson’s wife
worked at the CIA on weapons of mass destruction and that she was the
person who suggested Wilson for the job.

Officials have said Wilson, a former ambassador to Gabon and
National Security Council senior director for African affairs, was not
chosen because of his wife.

On July 12, two days before Novak’s column, a Post reporter was told
by an administration official that the White House had not paid
attention to the former ambassador’s CIA-sponsored trip to Niger
because it was set up as a boondoggle by his wife, an analyst with the
agency working on weapons of mass destruction. Plame’s name was never
mentioned and the purpose of the disclosure did not appear to be to
generate an article, but rather to undermine Wilson’s report.

After Novak’s column appeared, several high-profile reporters told
Wilson that they had received calls from White House officials drawing
attention to his wife’s role. Andrea Mitchell of NBC News said she
received one of those calls.

Wilson said another reporter called him on July 21 and said he had
just hung up with Bush’s senior adviser, Karl Rove. The reporter quoted
Rove as describing Wilson’s wife as “fair game,” Wilson said. Newsweek
has identified that reporter as MSNBC television host Chris Matthews.
Spokespeople said Matthews was unavailable for comment.

McClellan, the White House spokesman, has denied that Rove was
involved in leaking classified material but has refused to discuss the
possibility of a campaign to call attention to the revelations in
Novak’s column.

On July 17, the Time magazine Web site reported that “some
government officials have noted to Time in interviews, (as well as to
syndicated columnist Robert Novak) that Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame,
is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.” On July 22, Wilson appeared on NBC’s “Today” show and
said that disclosing the name of a U.S. intelligence officer would be
“a breach of national security,” could compromise that officer’s entire
network of contacts and could be a violation of federal law.

Wilson said that brought an immediate halt to the reports he had
been getting of anonymous attacks on him by White House officials.

An administration source said, “One of the greatest mysteries in all
this is what was really the rationale for doing it and doing it this
way.”

© 2003 washingtonpost.com

Borg Your Blog

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PUBLICIZING YOUR BLOG

ICE Free Tag Generator – Add tags to each blog entry to increase exposure in Technorati (and other services), as well as tags that allow people to easily subscribe using Simpy, Delicious, and other tools (scroll to the bottom of this entry to see examples of the possibilities).
http://www.egmstrategy.com/ice/tag-generator.cfm

Add subscribe buttons – These subscription buttons will help visitors add your blog entry to visitors’ Simpy, Delicious accounts .
http://www.edsupport.cc/mguhlin/blog/archives/2006/07/entry_1728.htm

Bloglines Subscribe Button – Get a bloglines account and then put subscribe buttons on your site for Bloglines:
http://bloglines.com/about/subscribe

iTunes Subscribe button – Save this graphic, insert it into your blog, then add this link (but customize the italicized part with your own RSS feed, of course).
Be sure to leave the ?format=pcast at the end:
http://feeds.feedburner.com/mguhlin-podcasts?format=pcast

Technorati Tags – Go to Technorati and get your own account, then follow directions to get the Technorati code to add to your blog page. It will look something like this:

<script type=”text/javascript” src=”http://embed.technorati.com/embed/q3gvitatm7.js”></script&gt;

http://www.technorati.com/signup/


TRACKING BLOG SUBSCRIBERS AND HITS:

Feedburner.com – Lets you track who’s subscribed to your RSS Feeds
http://feedburner.com

FeedBlitz – Allows people to subscribe to email versions of blog entries
http://www.feedblitz.com

BlogPatrol – Get a hit counter for your blog (tracks unique IP Addresses)
http://www.blogpatrol.com

StatCounter – Put this code on every page, and you can find out which of your blog entries are popular by counting the hits, etc.
http://www.statcounter.com

ClustrMaps – See visitors as red dots on your map of the world; works like a hit counter, too.
http://www.clustrmaps.com

GeoVisitors – Allows you to see who has visited your blog in the last 24 hours on a global map.
http://www.digitalpoint.com/tools/geovisitors/


COMMENTING AND CHAT

Haloscan – Enable commenting on your blog if it lacks that feature
http://www.haloscan.com

Gabbly.com – online chat
http://www.gabbly.com


BLOGROLLS, LINKROLLS, AND MORE

Blogrolling – lets you organize and easily share other blogs you read (this attracts traffic to your blog)
http://www.blogrolling.com/

OR,

Bloglines.com – if you are a a Bloglines.com user, you can turn your list of subscribed blogs into your blogroll. This prevents have to use a separate service (like Blogrolling previously mentioned) to show a list of subscriptions. I’ve now switched to this from Blogrolling (check the right sidebar on the FRONT page of this blog.
http://bloglines.com/help/share?tip=4

Simpy – let’s you bookmark sites and then share the list with others. Alternatives include Del.icio.us and Blinklist. I like Simpy most of all, though.
http://www.simpy.com
http://del.icio.us
http://www.blinklist.com

Read this quick how-to to add buttons that let people add your blog/entries to their bookmarks. You can create linkroll in your blog by following these instructions.

WikiSpaces.com – get your own wiki for free. Tell them you’re an educator and they remove all advertising
http://www.wikispaces.com

Library Thing – Lets you create and share your virtual booklist/reading with book covers, etc.
http://www.librarything.com/


MAKING A PODCAST

You can easily use free, web-based tools to create a podcast, as opposed to the more traditional use of Audacity, Acid, or Garageband.

Slapcast.com – Allows you to publish 3 audio files as podcasts, whether by uploading an MP3 file or calling a 1-888 number to record your podcast. After 3 podcasts, you have to pay $4.95 a month or subscribe to their service. Still, not a bad way to get started.
http://slapcast.com/

Clickcaster.com – Allows you to record/publish your podcasts, then sell them. Requires an account.
http://clickcaster.com

Odeo Studio – Allows you to create MP3 audio via a Web interface. You can also upload sound files, as well as record via phone. Includes syndication, etc.
http://studio.odeo.com/create/home

OurMedia – If you insist on using Audacity and/or other tools, then you should consider OurMedia and Internet Archive. I use both for publishing my audio.
http://www.ourmedia.org/help/publish-audio

Internet Archive – Very easy to contribute audio if you’ve created it already (that is, you have an MP3 saved on your computer). Follow instructions to create an account and then use the CC Publisher tool, or go to the web site below to contribute.
http://www.archive.org/contribute.php


PUBLICIZING YOUR PODCASTS

Use any one of the 13 services mentioned to publicize your podcasts, or, search them for podcasts to listen to

Technorati Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The great hobbit debate lives on, and it's coming to Philadelphia

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Tom Avril
Philadelphia Inquirer

Is fossil a new little human or a deformed human?

The great hobbit debate lives on, and it’s coming to Philadelphia.

Do the fossils of a 3-foot-tall, small-brained creature represent a new humanoid species, or don’t they?

The scientists who first found those remains on an Indonesian island in 2003, including an 18,000-year-old skull, published their latest evidence last week in favor of a new species.

The other side, which includes Robert Eckhardt of Pennsylvania State University, remains skeptical.

Both Eckhardt and Florida State University’s Dean Falk, a leader of the pro-new-species team, plan to be in Philadelphia in March for the annual meeting of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists.

Eckhardt maintains that the “hobbit” is merely a deformed human with some type of microcephaly, resulting in a brain one-third normal size. The fossils were found next to some advanced tools; Eckhardt says no creature with a brain that small could have made such tools, so they must have been made by the hobbit’s fellow humans.

In the latest paper, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Falk’s team used CAT scans to create a virtual model of what the new creature’s brain looked like. They compared that with the brains of both normal humans and microcephalics. Their conclusion: the hobbit – a nickname taken from the novels of J.R.R. Tolkien – is different from both.

Some participants in the debate have been less than civil; one has accused Falk’s team of being scientifically “naughty.” Eckhardt and Falk say they anticipate a collegial exchange in March, yet both hint that they may accuse the other side of errors.

“It will be a great, fun time,” says Eckhardt.

Adds Falk: “I can’t wait.”

THE OUTING OF A CIA AGENT, ARTICLE 1

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HOW IT BEGAN::Now, besides the Nicolas Kristof piece, this is the marrow of the beast:::
washingtonpost.com

CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data

Bush Used Report Of Uranium Bid

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

Thursday, June 12, 2003; Page A01

A key component of President Bush’s claim in his State
of the Union address last January that Iraq had an active nuclear
weapons program — its alleged attempt to buy uranium in Niger — was
disputed by a CIA-directed mission to the central African nation in
early 2002, according to senior administration officials and a former
government official. But the CIA did not pass on the detailed results
of its investigation to the White House or other government agencies,
the officials said.

The CIA’s failure to share what it knew, which has not been
disclosed previously, was one of a number of steps in the Bush
administration that helped keep the uranium story alive until the eve
of the war in Iraq, when the United Nations’ chief nuclear inspector
told the Security Council that the claim was based on fabricated
evidence.

A senior intelligence official said the CIA’s action was the result
of “extremely sloppy” handling of a central piece of evidence in the
administration’s case against then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. But,
the official added, “It is only one fact and not the reason we went to
war. There was a lot more.”

However, a senior CIA analyst said the case “is indicative of larger
problems” involving the handling of intelligence about Iraq’s alleged
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and its links to al
Qaeda, which the administration cited as justification for war.
“Information not consistent with the administration agenda was
discarded and information that was [consistent] was not seriously
scrutinized,” the analyst said.

As the controversy over Iraq intelligence has expanded with the
failure so far of U.S. teams in Iraq to uncover proscribed weapons,
intelligence officials have accused senior administration policymakers
of pressuring the CIA or exaggerating intelligence information to make
the case for war. The story involving the CIA’s uranium-purchase probe,
however, suggests that the agency also was shaping intelligence on Iraq
to meet the administration’s policy goals.

Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), former chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence and a candidate for president, yesterday described the
case as “part of the agency’s standard operating procedure when it
wants to advance the information that supported their [the
administration’s] position and bury that which didn’t.”

Armed with information purportedly showing that Iraqi officials had
been seeking to buy uranium in Niger one or two years earlier, the CIA
in early February 2002 dispatched a retired U.S. ambassador to the
country to investigate the claims, according to the senior U.S.
officials and the former government official, who is familiar with the
event. The sources spoke on condition of anonymity and on condition
that the name of the former ambassador not be disclosed.

During his trip, the CIA’s envoy spoke with the president of Niger
and other Niger officials mentioned as being involved in the Iraqi
effort, some of whose signatures purportedly appeared on the documents.

After returning to the United States, the envoy reported to the CIA
that the uranium-purchase story was false, the sources said. Among the
envoy’s conclusions was that the documents may have been forged because
the “dates were wrong and the names were wrong,” the former U.S.
government official said.

However, the CIA did not include details of the former ambassador’s
report and his identity as the source, which would have added to the
credibility of his findings, in its intelligence reports that were
shared with other government agencies. Instead, the CIA only said that
Niger government officials had denied the attempted deal had taken
place, a senior administration said.

“This gent made a visit to the region and chatted up his friends,” a
senior intelligence official said, describing the agency’s view of the
mission. “He relayed back to us that they said it was not true and that
he believed them.”

Thirteen months later, on March 8, Mohamed ElBaradei, director
general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, informed the U.N.
Security Council that after careful scrutiny of the Niger documents,
his agency had reached the same conclusion as the CIA’s envoy.
ElBaradei deemed the documents “not authentic,” an assessment that U.S.
officials did not dispute.

Knowledgeable sources familiar with the forgery investigation have
described the faked evidence as a series of letters between Iraqi
agents and officials in Niger. The documents had been sought by U.N.
inspectors since September 2002 and they were delivered by the United
States and Britain last February.

The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a panel of
nongovernment experts that is reviewing the handling of Iraq
intelligence, is planning to study the Niger story and how it made its
way into Bush’s State of the Union address on Jan. 28. In making the
case that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program, Bush declared
that “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

That same month, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and national
security adviser Condoleezza Rice also mentioned Iraq’s alleged
attempts to buy uranium, and the story made its way into a State
Department “fact sheet” as well.

Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Calif.), the ranking Democrat on the
Government Reform Committee and a leading administration critic, wrote
the president June 2 asking why Bush had included the Niger case as
part of the evidence he cited against Iraq. “Given what the CIA knew at
the time, the implication you intended — that there was credible
evidence that Iraq sought uranium from Africa — was simply false,”
Waxman said.

The CIA’s decision to send an emissary to Niger was triggered by
questions raised by an aide to Vice President Cheney during an agency
briefing on intelligence circulating about the purported Iraqi efforts
to acquire the uranium, according to the senior officials. Cheney’s
staff was not told at the time that its concerns had been the impetus
for a CIA mission and did not learn it occurred or its specific results.

Cheney and his staff continued to get intelligence on the matter,
but the vice president, unlike other senior administration officials,
never mentioned it in a public speech. He and his staff did not learn
of its role in spurring the mission until it was disclosed by New York
Times columnist Nicholas Kristof on May 6, according to an
administration official.

When the British government published an intelligence document on
Iraq in September 2002 claiming that Baghdad had “sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa,” the former ambassador called the
CIA officers who sent him to Niger and was told they were looking into
new information about the claim, sources said. The former envoy later
called the CIA and State Department after Bush’s State of the Union
speech and was told “not to worry,” according to one U.S. official.

Later it was disclosed that the United States and Britain were
basing their reports on common information that originated with forged
documents provided originally by Italian intelligence officials.

CIA Director George J. Tenet, on Sept. 24, 2002, cited the Niger
evidence in a closed-door briefing to the Senate intelligence committee
on a national intelligence estimate of Iraq’s weapons programs, sources
said. Although Tenet told the panel that some questions had been raised
about the evidence, he did not mention that the agency had sent an
envoy to Niger and that the former ambassador had concluded that the
claims were false.

The Niger evidence was not included in Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell’s Feb. 5 address to the Security Council in which he disclosed
some intelligence on Iraq’s alleged weapons programs and links to al
Qaeda because it was considered inaccurate, sources said.

Even so, the Voice of America on Feb. 20 broadcast a story that
said: “U.S. officials tell VOA [that] Iraq and Niger signed an
agreement in the summer of 2000 to resume shipments for an additional
500 tons of yellow cake,” a reference to the uranium. The VOA, which is
financed by the government but has an official policy of editorial
independence, went on to say that there was no evidence such shipments
had taken place.

© 2003 The Washington Post Company

washingtonpost.com:

Why truth matters

Stories

 Nicholas Kristof: Why truth matters – May. 6, 2003

By Nicholas D. Kristof Op-Ed Columnist, New York Times

 When I raised the Mystery of the Missing W.M.D. recently, hawks fired barrages of reproachful e-mail at me. The gist was: “You *&#! Who cares if we never find weapons of mass destruction, because we’ve liberated the Iraqi people from a murderous tyrant.”

But it does matter, enormously, for American credibility. After all, as Ari Fleischer said on April 10 about W.M.D.: “That is what this war was about.” I rejoice in the newfound freedoms in Iraq. But there are indications that the U.S. government souped up intelligence, leaned on spooks to change their conclusions and concealed contrary information to deceive people at home and around the world. Let’s fervently hope that tomorrow we find an Iraqi superdome filled with 500 tons of mustard gas and nerve gas, 25,000 liters of anthrax, 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 29,984 prohibited munitions capable of delivering chemical agents, several dozen Scud missiles, gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, 18 mobile biological warfare factories, long-range unmanned aerial vehicles to dispense anthrax, and proof of close ties with Al Qaeda.

Those are the things that President Bush or his aides suggested Iraq might have, and I don’t want to believe that top administration officials tried to win support for the war with a campaign of wholesale deceit. Consider the now-disproved claims by President Bush and Colin Powell that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger so it could build nuclear weapons. As Seymour Hersh noted in The New Yorker, the claims were based on documents that had been forged so amateurishly that they should never have been taken seriously. I’m told by a person involved in the Niger caper that more than a year ago the vice president’s office asked for an investigation of the uranium deal, so a former U.S. ambassador to Africa was dispatched to Niger. In February 2002, according to someone present at the meetings, that envoy reported to the C.I.A. and State Department that the information was unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been forged.

The envoy reported, for example, that a Niger minister whose signature was on one of the documents had in fact been out of office for more than a decade. In addition, the Niger mining program was structured so that the uranium diversion had been impossible. The envoy’s debunking of the forgery was passed around the administration and seemed to be accepted — except that President Bush and the State Department kept citing it anyway. “It’s disingenuous for the State Department people to say they were bamboozled because they knew about this for a year,” one insider said.

Another example is the abuse of intelligence from Hussein Kamel, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein and head of Iraq’s biological weapons program until his defection in 1995. Top British and American officials kept citing information from Mr. Kamel as evidence of a huge secret Iraqi program, even though Mr. Kamel had actually emphasized that Iraq had mostly given up its W.M.D. program in the early 1990’s. Glen Rangwala, a British Iraq expert, says the transcript of Mr. Kamel’s debriefing was leaked because insiders resented the way politicians were misleading the public.

Patrick Lang, a former head of Middle Eastern affairs in the Defense Intelligence Agency, says that he hears from those still in the intelligence world that when experts wrote reports that were skeptical about Iraq’s W.M.D., “they were encouraged to think it over again.” “In this administration, the pressure to get product `right’ is coming out of O.S.D. [the Office of the Secretary of Defense],” Mr. Lang said.

He added that intelligence experts had cautioned that Iraqis would not necessarily line up to cheer U.S. troops and that the Shiite clergy could be a problem.

“The guys who tried to tell them that came to understand that this advice was not welcome,” he said.

“The intelligence that our officials was given regarding W.M.D. was either defective or manipulated,” Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico noted. Another senator is even more blunt and, sadly, exactly right: “Intelligence was manipulated.” The C.I.A. was terribly damaged when William Casey, its director in the Reagan era, manipulated intelligence to exaggerate the Soviet threat in Central America to whip up support for Ronald Reagan’s policies. Now something is again rotten in the state of Spookdom.

New York Times.

John Kerry, France and Susan Sarandon

Stories

It is no secret that Michael Graham hates John Kerry,
France and Susan Sarandon. This, of course, does not require that they
be linked together whenever Kerry makes a statement that Graham
doesn’t agree with (“Mon Dieu! Send Kerry to Paris,”
Jan. 31).

    Kerry
was correct in his criticisms of U.S. foreign policy. It is sad that
Graham, having no coherent rebuttal, resorts to the right wing’s
usual anti-France, anti-Sarandon invective. It is even sadder if one
takes into account that U.S. public opinion has so turned against this
administration’s policies that this childish tactic no longer has
any impact.

    While
there is no doubt that Kerry has made a number of questionable, even
embarrassing public statements, a responsible newspaper would publish a
serious critique of the senator’s position, not the apoplectic
ravings of a third-rate talk radio personality.

    – Jim Sullivan, Boston

BostonHerald.com